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FRIEDRICHS AND THE MOVE TOWARD PRIVATE  
ORDERING OF WAGES AND BENEFITS  
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
MARIA O’BRIEN HYLTON* 
 
*** 
In its recent Harris v. Quinn opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court (in 
particular Justice Alito) seemed to welcome a future opportunity to 
reconsider the 1977 landmark Abood decision in which public sector closed 
shop employees were not required to join a union but could be subject to fees 
that cover the costs of “collective bargaining, contract administration, and 
grievance adjustment purposes.”  Supporters of the Abood approach argue 
that it is a reasonable compromise that prevents non-members from free 
riding on the union’s efforts (i.e. enjoying the wages and benefits negotiated 
by the union without sharing the costs incurred).  Detractors and the 
plaintiffs in Friedrichs argue that free riding concerns are insufficient to 
overcome serious First Amendment objections.  The central idea is that all 
bargaining in the public sector is inherently political. Public sector pays, 
tenure and benefits (especially expensive retiree health care and pension 
promises), it is claimed, now profoundly affect the ability of state and local 
governments to function in many jurisdictions.  This article briefly reviews 
the major claim in Friedrichs—that public sector agency agreements violate 
the First Amendment--and considers the implications of a decision that, but 
for Justice Scalia’s unexpected death almost certainly would have 
overturned Abood.  What would this mean for financially strapped state and 
local governments? To understand what a victory for the Friedrichs 
plaintiffs would mean, this paper looks at recent data from Wisconsin which 
dramatically constrained public sector agency agreements a few years ago 
and has seen public union membership, union revenue and political power 
plunge as a result.  If Friedrichs had overturned Abood during the 2016 
term, we would now expect to see national patterns similar to those observed 
in Wisconsin. In many places around the country a drop in public sector 
                                                                                                                          
*I am indebted to attendees of the 5th Annual Employee Benefits 
Conference in Hartford, CT for valuable comments and feedback and to individuals 
at AFSCME Council 32 in Wisconsin and Jim Underhill, Director of the Bureau of 
Compensation and Labor Relations for the State of Wisconsin for helpful 
conversations and suggestions about how to obtain post Act 10 data. Thanks also to 
Harrison Kaplan, Tyler Patterson, and Jordan Shelton for top notch research 
assistance. 
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union political power would be expected to translate into a climate more 




Until recently, conventional wisdom suggested that the petitioners 
in the Friedrichs1 case were likely to prevail on their core claim that payment 
of agency fees to a public sector union (in this case the California Teachers 
Association) violated non-union members’ First Amendment rights by 
forcing them to subsidize political speech with which they disagree.2 The 
                                                                                                                          
1 The petitioners first filed their suit to end mandatory union dues on April 29, 
2013. The case was decided rather fast by the district court on December 5, 2013 
because the petitioners requested judgment be entered for the defendant unions. 
Though the move seems odd, the petitioners believed their case brought up a unique 
legal issue and that only the Supreme Court possessed the authority to grant the relief 
they requested. Upon immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the petitioners again 
requested judgment for the defendants, and, on November 18, 2014, the Ninth 
Circuit granted a Summary Affirmance of the district court. Friedrichs and her co-
plaintiffs filed for certiorari on January 26, 2015, and the Supreme Court granted 
cert on June 30, 2015. The case was argued on Jan. 11, 2016 before a full Supreme 
Court; however, the sudden death of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia on February 
13, 2016 left only eight justices to decide the case. Justice Scalia, “who hinted 
strongly during oral arguments in January that he considered mandatory dues 
unconstitutional, would have likely been a deciding vote.” However, on March 29, 
2016, the Supreme Court issued a Per Curiam, one-line opinion: “The judgment is 
affirmed by an equally divided Court.” The death of Scalia certainly led to the 
divided opinion, as the late justice was an all but official fifth vote for the petitioners, 
and allowed the unions to continue to collect mandatory union dues. Though the 
plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing on April 8, 2016, the still short-handed Supreme 
Court denied the petition on June 28, 2016, leaving the unions the freedom to collect 
mandatory dues for the foreseeable future. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Assoc., 
578 U. S. ____ (2016); Haley Sweetland Edwards, How Antonin Scalia’s Death Will 
Help Teachers’ Unions, TIME (Feb. 16, 2016); Freidrichs v CTA: Case Timeline, 
THE CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. (July 16, 2016), https://www.cir-
usa.org/cases/friedrichs-v-california-teachers-association-et-al/friedrichs-v-cta-
timeline/.  
2 Justice Alito’s opinions in Knox v. SEIU Local 1000 and in Harris v. Quinn 
make clear his view that Abood was wrongly decided and that agency fee 
arrangements by non-members amount to state-coerced speech, which cannot 
withstand the strict scrutiny required under the First Amendment.  
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Acceptance of the free-rider argument as a justification for 
compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues represents 
something of an anomaly--one that we have found to be justified 
by the interest in furthering “labor peace” [citation omitted]. But 
it is an anomaly nonetheless. Similarly, requiring objecting 
nonmembers to opt out of paying the nonchargeable portion of 
union dues--as opposed to exempting them from making such 
payments unless they opt in--represents a remarkable boon for 
unions. Courts “do not presume acquiescence in the loss of 
fundamental rights.” [citation omitted] Once it is recognized, as 
our cases have, that a nonmember cannot be forced to fund a 
union's political or ideological activities, what is the justification 
for putting the burden on the nonmember to opt out of making 
such a payment? Shouldn't the default rule comport with the 
probable preferences of most nonmembers? And isn't it likely that 
most employees who choose not to join the union that represents 
their bargaining unit prefer not to pay the full amount of union 
dues? An opt-out system creates a risk that the fees paid by 
nonmembers will be used to further political and ideological ends 
with which they do not agree. But a “[u]nion should not be 
permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first 
establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds 
will be used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities 
unrelated to collective bargaining. 
Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012).  
In upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois law, the Seventh 
Circuit relied on this Court’s decision in Abood supra, which held 
that state employees who choose not to join a public-sector union 
may nevertheless be compelled to pay an agency fee to support 
union work that is related to the collective-bargaining process. 
[citation omitted] Two Terms ago, in Knox [citation omitted], we 
pointed out that Abood is “something of an anomaly.” [citation 
omitted] “‘The primary purpose’ of permitting unions to collect 
fees from nonmembers,” we noted, “is ‘to prevent nonmembers 
from free-riding on the union’s efforts, sharing the employment 
benefits obtained by the union’s collective bargaining without 
sharing the costs incurred.’” [citations omitted] But “[s]uch free-
rider arguments . . . are generally insufficient to overcome First 
Amendment objections.” [citation omitted] For this reason, Abood 
stands out, but the State of Illinois now asks us to sanction what 
amounts to a very significant expansion of Abood—so that it 
applies, not just to full-fledged public employees, but also to 
others who are deemed to be public employees solely for the 
purpose of unionization and the collection of an agency fee. 
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Supreme Court, following oral argument on January 11, 2016, seemed 
poised to undo the decades-old compromise embodied in Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education,3 which allowed non-members to pay an amount less 
than the full membership fee but sufficient to cover the costs of “collective 
bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment purposes.”4 
The startling death of Justice Scalia deprived the Court of the fifth vote 
                                                                                                                          
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2627 (2014). 
3 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235-6 (1977) (holding that the 
Constitution allows public sector unions to “spend funds for the expression of 
political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other 
ideological views,” but restricting these expenditures to employees who do not 
object to those ideas and were not “coerced” into joining the union by threat of the 
loss of their position); See also Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., 466 U.S. 435, 448-56 (1984) 
(holding that public unions could use funds from objecting members forced into 
union contributions to pay for union conventions, publications, and “de minimus” 
social activities, but not for organizing costs or litigation that is not “directly 
concerned” with the union and its bargaining function); see also Chicago Teachers 
Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986) (holding that “the constitutional 
requirements for [a] [u]nion’s collection of agency fees include an adequate 
explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge 
the amount of the fee before an impartial decision maker, and an escrow for the 
amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending”); see also Knox, 
132 S. Ct. at  2295-6 (stating that public sector unions have a right to express political 
and social views “without government interference,” but dissenters who chose not 
to join the union and are required to pay dues have the same right; thus, the Court 
held, “when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the 
union must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may not exact any funds from 
nonmembers without their affirmative consent”); see also Harris, 134 S. Ct. at  2636, 
2638 (limiting “Abood’s reach to full-fledged state employees” and refusing to 
extend it to semi-public employees when the union does not have “the full scope of 
powers and duties generally available under American Labor law.”). 
4 Abood, 431 U.S. at 232. 
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needed to overturn Abood.5 The Court issued a 4-4 split decision on March 
29, 2016, which means Abood lives on—at least for a while.6  
                                                                                                                          
5  On March 29, 2016, Adam Liptak of The New York Times called the 
Friedrichs decision “the starkest illustration yet of how the sudden death of Antonin 
Scalia last month has blocked the power of the court’s four remaining conservatives 
to move the law to the right.” Adam Liptak, Victory for Unions as Supreme Court, 
Scalia Gone, Ties 4-4, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2016 (“the starkest illustration yet of 
how the sudden death of Antonin Scalia last month has blocked the power of the 
court’s four remaining conservatives to move the law to the right). However, Liptak 
went further, explaining the broader effects of Scalia’s death on the Court: “His 
death changed the balance of power in this case, and most likely in many others. The 
clout of the court’s four-member liberal wing has increased significantly. Its 
members — Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor 
and Elena Kagan — can create deadlocks, as they did Tuesday, and they can 
sometimes attract the vote of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy for a liberal result.” Id. 
6 See Daniel Hamel & David Louk, Much Abood About Nothing?, WHATEVER  
SOURCE DERIVED (Mar. 29, 2016), https://medium.com/whatever-source-
derived/much-abood-about-nothing-447dbe2758eb#.hd1dp0tcc. Hamel and Louk 
lay out the significance of allowing Abood to live on, but suggest there may be an 
alternative for Abood’s “agency shops” in a so-called “direct payment alternative.” 
Id. However, they recognize that this alternative would not be feasible in states with 
a Democratic legislature and a Republican governor, where Abood is all that allows 
unions the power to collect from unwilling participants. 
Laws in almost half of U.S. states allow unions and public sector 
employers to set up so-called “agency shops.” Employees in an 
agency shop need not join their local union, but the workers who 
opt not to join the union still must pay a “fair-share” or “agency” 
fee to cover their pro rata portion of the union’s collective 
bargaining costs. Starting with the 1977 case Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, the Supreme Court has said that agency shop 
arrangements do not violate the First Amendment rights of public 
sector employees. The primary question in today’s case, 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, was whether 
Abood remains good law. For now, it does. Today’s 4–4 split 
means that the lower court’s decision in Friedrichs is affirmed, and 
the lower court (the Ninth Circuit) abided by Abood. So agency 
shops can continue to exist in the 20-odd states that allow them. . 
. . To be sure, there are some agency shop states in which Abood’s 
fate matters significantly for public sector unions. Prime examples 
include Illinois and New Jersey — states with Democratic 
majorities in the legislature but Republicans in the governor’s 
mansion. If agency shop laws had been struck down and the 
legislatures in those states had passed bills to implement the direct 
payment alternative, we think it quite likely that the governors in 
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This less-than-total membership cost is either a constitutionally 
impermissible compulsory payment or a reasonable compromise that has 
served both labor and public sector employers’ interests well for many years. 
At oral argument it certainly appeared there were five votes in favor of the 
former position and, as one commentator noted, “Abood is in plenty of 
trouble.”7 
This paper is not about the merits of the arguments made in 
Freidrichs nor does it offer a theory of the First Amendment or of collective 
bargaining in the public sector. There exists a substantial body of work, 
which attempts to do one or more of these things.8 This paper examines the 
                                                                                                                          
those states (Bruce Rauner and Chris Christie, respectively) would 
have exercised their veto power. In states like Hawaii and 
California, by contrast, the demise of Abood likely would have led 
Democratic lawmakers to pass — and the Democratic governor to 
sign — legislation implementing the direct payment alternative. 
Id. 
7 Lee H. Adler, Free Speech, Free Riders and the Fate of the Union Agency Fee, 
27 DLR I-1, Feb. 11, 2016.  
The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Friedrichs after its recent decisions in Knox and Harris means that 
Abood is in plenty of trouble. The longstanding consensus, which 
balances an actual but modest infringement on nonmembers' 
association and speech rights with a union's need to pay for the 
services it renders to all in a bargaining unit, is in question. . . . 
th[is] new jurisprudence reflects an active change of focus toward 
“individual” rights that has an effect of undermining the ability of 
public employees to accomplish collective objectives. Collective 
bargaining and union representation require a funding source, and 
that source must be the employees who receive the benefits of 
union representation. But Knox and Harris and the petitioners in 
Friedrichs would make raising those funds as difficult as possible, 
even when state governments believe it is in their own best 
interests. This indifference towards state's rights, the distaste 
shown by Justice Alito and the Friedrichs petitioners towards the 
compromise thinking in Abood, and the apparent rush of the Court 
to consider altering the careful First Amendment balance still alive 
in Locke suggest an exaltation of individual rights over the 
common weal that is not particularly well-explained. 
Id. 
8 See Jake Wasserman, Gutting Public Sector Unions: Friedrichs v. California 
Teachers Association, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 229 (2016) 
(discussing a potential constitutional challenge public-sector unions would face in 
Friedrichs that might “lead to their demise;” further discussing the potential for 
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expected effects of a decision, which was on the verge of overturning Abood, 
and, in particular, the effect of such a change on public sector employee 
benefits costs and total budgets.  
Using data from Wisconsin following that state’s enactment of Act 
10 (the 2011 Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill),9 which largely eliminated 
collective bargaining for state public employees, I trace the effects on 
membership in Wisconsin’s largest teacher union and on it lobbying efforts 
and membership levels. Act 10 has been nothing short of catastrophic for 
Wisconsin’s public sector unions.10 There is every reason to believe that the 
                                                                                                                          
Friedrichs to “have a broad impact on public-sector unions’ financial health and 
political clout, as well as politics more broadly,” should Abood have been 
overruled.); Id. at 236-237 (noting  that the constitutional arguments Friedrichs 
advanced in her brief were not complicated, calling Abood a constitutionally 
indefensible compromise, a “jurisprudential outlier,” and irreconcilable with [the 
Supreme] Court’s decision in every related First Amendment context,” further 
rejecting the notions that employees who opt out of unions are “free-riding” and that 
this issue is compelling enough to “withstand exacting scrutiny. Id at 234-36. 
However, the union’s arguments were even simpler, noting that stare decisis should 
result in Abood being reaffirmed because it “correctly reflects” the state’s interest in 
managing labor relations and that the employee’s 1st Amendment “interests against 
compelled agency fees are ‘certainly not stronger than the interest in affirmative 
expression.’”). Id. at 237 (noting, the unions “point[ed] out that ‘strong reliance 
interests have developed around the agency-shop model,’ and note outlawing 
agency-shop agreements would ‘overrule the judgments of 23 States plus the District 
of Columbia’ . . . [and] tens of thousands of collective-bargaining agreements 
governing public employees would be thrown into disarray.”). 
9 Assemb. B. 11, 2011-2012 Legis. Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011). 
10 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Wisconsin’s Legacy for Unions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2014. 
Three years ago, a labor leader named Marty Beil was one of the 
loudest opponents of Gov. Scott Walker’s “budget repair bill,” a 
proposal that brought tens of thousands of protesters out to the 
Wisconsin State Capitol in Madison in frigid February weather. A 
gruff-voiced grizzly of a man, Mr. Beil warned that the bill was 
rigged with booby traps that would cripple the state’s public-
sector unions. He gets no satisfaction from being right. Since the 
law was passed, membership in his union, which represents state 
employees, has fallen 60 percent; its annual budget has plunged to 
$2 million from $6 million. Mr. Walker’s landmark law — called 
Act 10 — severely restricted the power of public-employee unions 
to bargain collectively, and that provision, among others, has 
given social workers, prison guards, nurses and other public 
employees little reason to pay dues to a union that can no longer 
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parties which organized and funded the Friedrichs litigation will try again 
given Justice Alito’s near invitation to litigate the constitutionality of 
Abood.11 One would expect that the re-try will take place fairly quickly in 
the event the next Supreme Court appointee is viewed as sharing Scalia’s 
views.12  
                                                                                                                          
do much for them. Members of Mr. Beil’s group, the Wisconsin 
State Employees’ Union, complain that their take-home pay has 
fallen more than 10 percent in recent years, a sign of the union’s 
greatly diminished power. “It’s had a devastating effect on our 
union,” Mr. Beil, its executive director, said of Act 10. He was 
sitting in his Madison office, inside the headquarters that his 
union, hard up for cash, may be forced to sell. The building is 
underused anyway, as staff reductions have left many offices 
empty. 
Id. 
11 In his harsh and unyielding opinion, Justice Alito criticized nearly every facet 
of the Abood decision. 
The Abood Court’s analysis is questionable on several grounds. 
Some of these were noted or apparent at or before the time of the 
decision, but several have become more evident and troubling in 
the years since then. The Abood Court seriously erred in treating 
Hanson and Street as having all but decided the constitutionality 
of compulsory payments to a public-sector union. As we have 
explained, Street was not a constitutional decision at all, and 
Hanson disposed of the critical question in a single, unsupported 
sentence that its author essentially abandoned a few years later. 
Surely a First Amendment issue of this importance deserved better 
treatment. . . Abood does not seem to have anticipated the 
magnitude of the practical administrative problems that would 
result in attempting to classify public-sector union expenditures as 
either “chargeable” (in Abood’s terms, expenditures for 
“collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-
adjustment purposes,” (citation omitted) or nonchargeable (i.e., 
expenditures for political or ideological purposes, (citation 
omitted). In the years since Abood, the Court has struggled 
repeatedly with this issue (citations omitted).    . . . Finally, a 
critical pillar of the Abood Court’s analysis rests on an 
unsupported empirical assumption, namely, that the principle of 
exclusive representation in the public sector is dependent on a 
union or agency shop.   
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632-2634. 
12 See Adam Liptak, Study Calls Snub of Obama’s Supreme Court Pick 
Unprecendented, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2016 (noting that The Republican Senate is 
fighting hard to ensure that the next Justice on the Court shares Scalia’s view. 
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 It is for this reason that the conditions in Wisconsin post-Act 10 
provide a near-perfect laboratory in which to examine what happens when 
public sector unions can no longer compel even a modest level of support for 
their activities from members and non-members.  What can be observed in 
Wisconsin is an astonishing drop in public sector union membership levels, 
and lobbying activity (which I view as a reasonable proxy for political 
strength).  To the extent that public sector union strength accounts for the 
level of spending on employee benefits—especially pensions and high cost 
health insurance for active employees and retirees—we should expect to see 
these costs come down over time in Wisconsin and in any other state that 
outlaws agency fees.  This means that strained state budgets could well be 
the first beneficiaries of the movement to eliminate agency fees.13 This 
move—toward private ordering of wages and benefits in the public sector 
and away from the morally hazardous process that currently determines the 
overall compensation of public employees14—will have a profound effect on 
                                                                                                                          
President Obama’s current nominee, Merrick Garland, has failed to even be given a 
hearing in the Senate at the time this paper was written); Id. (“Senate Republicans 
say they will not consider any nominee offered by Mr. Obama to replace Justice 
Antonin Scalia, who died in February. The power to appoint Justice Scalia’s 
successor, they say, should belong to the next president.”).  
13 The MacIver Institute, a Wisconsin-based conservative think tank, suggests that 
Act 10 has been remarkably successful in saving Wisconsin taxpayer dollars and 
lowering the state funds spent on public sector pensions and benefits: 
[Act 10] has saved Wisconsin taxpayers $5.24 billion, according 
to a new analysis by the MacIver Institute. The analysis found that 
Wisconsin saved $3.36 billion by requiring government 
employees contribute a reasonable amount to their own 
retirement. The analysis also estimates local units of governments 
saved an additional $404.8 million total by taking common sense 
steps like opening their employees' health insurance to 
competitive bidding. Milwaukee Public Schools saved $1.3 billion 
in long-term pension liabilities, and Neenah saved $97 million in 
long-term pension liabilities in addition to other savings. 
Brett Healy, Act 10 Saves Wisconsin Taxpayers More Than $5 Billion Over 5 Years, 
MacIver Analysis Finds, MACIVER INST. (Feb. 11, 2016) http://www.maciver 
institute.com/2016/02/act-10-saves-wisconsin-taxpayers-more-than-5-billion-over-
5-years-maciver-analysis-finds/. 
14 Daniel Disalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, NAT’L AFF. Fall 
2010, at 3. 
The very nature of many public services — such as policing 
the streets and putting out fires — gives government a monopoly 
or near monopoly; striking public employees could therefore hold 
the public hostage. As long-time New York Times labor reporter 
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public sector budgets and the ability of public unions to seeks rents that result 
in wages and benefits that are relatively generous when compared with the 
private sector.  This process appears to be underway in Wisconsin.  When 
the issue in Friedrichs once again comes before the Court15 the experience 
in Wisconsin should provide some guidance about what to expect on a 
national scale. 
II. LESSONS FROM WISCONSIN AFTER ACT 10 
To understand what a post-Friedrichs world might have looked like, 
it helps to look back at the changes that have taken place in Wisconsin since 
the passage of Act 10 in 2011.  Also known as the Wisconsin Budget Repair 
Bill, Act 10 was signed into law by then newly-elected Governor Scott 
Walker.16 Act 10 largely eliminated collective bargaining for public 
employees in the state except for law enforcement and fire protection 
personnel.17 Act 10 expressly forbid general employees from bargaining 
                                                                                                                          
A. H. Raskin wrote in 1968: "The community cannot tolerate the 
notion that it is defenseless at the hands of organized workers to 
whom it has entrusted responsibility for essential services." 
“When it comes to advancing their interests, public-sector unions 
have significant advantages over traditional unions. For one thing, 
using the political process, they can exert far greater influence 
over their members' employers — that is, government — than 
private-sector unions can. Through their extensive political 
activity, these government-workers' unions help elect the very 
politicians who will act as "management" in their contract 
negotiations — in effect handpicking those who will sit across the 
bargaining table from them, in a way that workers in a private 
corporation (like, say, American Airlines or the Washington Post 
Company) cannot. Such power led Victor Gotbaum, the leader of 
District Council 37 of the AFSCME in New York City, to brag in 
1975: "We have the ability, in a sense, to elect our own boss. 
Id. at 6-7, 10. 
15  How fast this happens will be a function of the perceived political orientation 
of Justice Scalia’s replacement. 
16 Assemb. B. 11, 2011-2012 Legis. Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011). 
17 See Martin H. Mail, The Legislative Upheaval in Public Sector Labor Law:  
A Search for Common Elements, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149 (2012) (noting 
that when the bill was introduced “Senate Democrats fled to Illinois, denying the 
super-majority quorum needed under state law to consider fiscal legislation.  While 
the Democrats were still out of the state, the Republicans stripped out provisions that 
they believed required the super quorum and enacted the bill. The controversy 
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collectively on issues other than base wages;18 prohibits municipal 
employers from deducting labor organization dues from paychecks of 
general employees;19 imposes annual recertification requirements20 and 
                                                                                                                          
produced public demonstrations on a scale Madison had not seen since the Vietnam 
War.  The Dane County Circuit Court enjoined the enactment on the ground that the 
legislature violated the state’s open meeting laws, but in a party-line four to three 
vote, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, and Act 10 took effect.”). 
18 Wisc. Stat. § 111.70 (4) (mb),  
Prohibited subjects of bargaining; general municipal 
employees. The municipal employer is prohibited from bargaining 
collectively with a collective bargaining unit containing a general 
municipal employee with respect to any of the following: 1. Any 
factor or condition of employment except wages, which includes 
only total base wages and excludes any other compensation, which 
includes, but is not limited to, overtime, premium pay, merit pay, 
performance pay, supplemental compensation, pay schedules, and 
automatic pay progressions.  
Id. 
19 Id at § 111.06 (1) (i).  
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer individually or 
in concert with others . . . [t]o deduct labor organization dues or 
assessments from an employee's earnings, unless the employer has 
been presented with an individual order therefore, signed by the 
employee personally, and terminable by the employee giving to 
the employer at least 30 days' written notice of the termination. 
This paragraph applies to the extent permitted under federal law. 
Id. 
20 Id at § 111.83 (3) (b).  
Annually, no later than December 1, the commission shall 
conduct an election to certify the representative of a collective 
bargaining unit that contains a general employee. There shall be 
included on the ballot the names of all labor organizations having 
an interest in representing the general employees participating in 
the election. The commission may exclude from the ballot one 
who, at the time of the election, stands deprived of his or her rights 
under this subchapter by reason of a prior adjudication of his or 
her having engaged in an unfair labor practice. The commission 
shall certify any representative that receives at least 51 percent of 
the votes of all of the general employees in the collective 
bargaining unit. If no representative receives at least 51 percent of 
the votes of all of the general employees in the collective 
bargaining unit, at the expiration of the collective bargaining 
agreement, the commission shall decertify the current 
representative and the general employees shall be nonrepresented. 
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disallows fair share agreements which require non-represented general 
employees to make contributions to labor organizations.21  
 
A. THE STATE COURT CHALLENGE 
 
In August 2011, unhappy with the new law, two Wisconsin unions—
the Madison Teachers, Inc. and Public Employees Local 6122 filed suit in 
Wisconsin state court against Governor Walker.23  The unions alleged, inter 
                                                                                                                          
Notwithstanding s. 111.82, if a representative is decertified under 
this paragraph, the affected general employees may not be 
included in a substantially similar collective bargaining unit for 12 
months from the date of decertification. The commission’s 
certification of the results of any election is conclusive unless 
reviewed as provided by s. 111.07 (8). 
Id. 
21 Id at § 111.85 (1) (a)-(b).  
(a) No fair-share or maintenance of membership agreement 
covering public safety employees may become effective unless 
authorized by a referendum. The commission shall order a 
referendum whenever it receives a petition supported by proof that 
at least 30 percent of the public safety employees in a collective 
bargaining unit desire that a fair-share or maintenance of 
membership agreement be entered into between the employer and 
a labor organization. A petition may specify that a referendum is 
requested on a maintenance of membership agreement only, in 
which case the ballot shall be limited to that question. (b) For a 
fair-share agreement to be authorized, at least two-thirds of the 
eligible public safety employees voting in a referendum shall vote 
in favor of the agreement. For a maintenance of membership 
agreement to be authorized, at least a majority of the eligible 
public safety employees voting in a referendum shall vote in favor 
of the agreement. In a referendum on a fair-share agreement, if 
less than two-thirds but more than one-half of the eligible public 
safety employees vote in favor of the agreement, a maintenance of 
membership agreement is authorized. 
Id.   
22 Madison Teachers Inc. is a union representing over 4000 municipal 
employees of the Madison Metropolitan School District. Local 61 represents 
approximately 300 City of Milwaukee employees.   
23 See Madison Teachers Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337 (2014). 
In August 2011, Madison Teachers, Inc. and Public 
Employees Local 61 sued Governor Walker and the three 
commissioners of the Wisconsin Employment Relations 
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alia, that Act 10 violated the constitutional free speech, free association and 
equal protection rights of the represented employees. The Wisconsin Circuit 
Court agreed with the unions and invalidated several provisions of Act 10, 
including those related to collective bargaining.  On July 31, 2014 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a 5 to 2 decision reversed the lower court 
ruling and upheld Act 10 in its entirety.  The Court’s view was that while 
union members certainly enjoy a constitutional right to free association, that 
protection does not extend to collective bargaining.  Justice Gableman wrote 
for the majority: 
 This point is vital and bears repeating:  the plaintiff’s associational 
rights are in no way implicated by Act 10’s modifications to Wisconsin’s 
collective bargaining framework.  At issue in this case is the State’s 
implementation of an exclusive representation system for permitting public 
employers and public employees to negotiate certain employment terms in 
good faith . . . Represented municipal employees, non-represented municipal 
employees, and certified representatives lose no right or ability to associate 
to engage in constitutionally protected speech because their ability to do so 
outside the framework of statutory collective bargaining is not impaired.  Act 
10 merely provides general employees with a statutory mechanism to force 
their employer to collectively bargain; outside of this narrow context, to 
which the plaintiffs freely concede public employees have no constitutional 
right, every avenue for petitioning the government remains available.24 
 Essentially, the majority in Walker adopts the view that 
constitutional protections of freedom of association are not impaired because 
                                                                                                                          
Commission challenging several provisions of Act 10. The 
plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that four aspects of Act 
10—the collective bargaining limitations, the prohibition on 
payroll deductions of labor organization dues, the prohibition of 
fair share agreements, and the annual recertification 
requirements—violate the constitutional associational and equal 
protection rights of the employees they represent. The plaintiffs 
also challenged Wis. Stat. § 62.623 (2011-12), a separate 
provision created by Act 10, which prohibits the City of 
Milwaukee from paying the employee share of contributions to 
the City of Milwaukee Employees’ Retirement System, alleging it 
violates the home rule amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution. 
The plaintiffs argued, in the alternative, that if Wis. Stat. § 62.623 
does not violate the home rule amendment, it nevertheless violates 
the constitutionally protected right of parties to contract with each 
other. 
Id. at 345. 
24  Id. at 355-365. 
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Act 10 does not limit the ability of any member to associate outside of the 
“framework”.25  Fairly predictable responses followed the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s decision.26 
 
B.  FEDERAL LITIGATION 
 
The Seventh Circuit has twice had occasion to consider Act 10. In 
Wisconsin Education Assoc. Council v. Walker27 and Laborers Local 236 v. 
Walker,28 the Court considered the payroll deduction provisions and the free 
                                                                                                                          
25 Id. at 356 (“The defendants are not barring the plaintiffs from joining any 
advocacy groups, limiting their ability to do so, or otherwise curtailing the ability to 
join other ‘like-minded’ individuals to associate for the purpose of expressing 
commonly held views…”). 
26 Nick Novak, Wisconsin Supreme Court Upholds Scott Walker’s Act 10 “in 
its Entirety”, MACIVER INST. (Jul. 31, 2014, 11:27 AM), http://www.maciver 
institute.com/2014/07/wisconsin-supreme-court-upholds-act-10-in-its-entirety/ 
(“Act 10 has saved Wisconsin taxpayers more than $3 billion. Today’s ruling is a 
victory for those hard-working taxpayers”); See also id. (“Wisconsin’s proud history 
of protecting worker’s rights is marred by Walker and Republicans’ dismantling of 
collective bargaining for our public sector workers. Today’s Supreme Court ruling 
is extremely disappointing for the teachers, nurses, prison guards, and other 
professionals who serve the public each day.”).       
27 Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F. 3d 640 (7th Cir. 2013).  
Plaintiffs and cross-appellants, representing seven of Wisconsin's 
largest public sector unions (the "Unions"), filed suit against 
defendants-appellants Governor Scott Walker and other state 
actors, challenging three provisions of the statute—the limitations 
on collective bargaining, the recertification requirements, and a 
prohibition on payroll deduction of dues—under the Equal 
Protection Clause. They also challenged the payroll deduction 
provision under the First Amendment. The district court 
invalidated Act 10's recertification and payroll deduction 
provisions, but upheld the statute's limitation on collective 
bargaining. We now uphold Act 10 in its entirety. 
Id. at 642. 
28 Laborers Local 236, AFL-CIO v. Walker, 749 F. 3d 628 (7th Cir. 2014).  
This case raises more challenges to the constitutionality of 
Wisconsin's Act 10, which we last addressed in [Wis. Educ. Ass’n 
Council v Walker]. Act 10 made significant changes to Wisconsin 
public-sector labor law: it prohibited government employers from 
collectively bargaining with their general employees over 
anything except base wages, made it more challenging for general-
employee unions to obtain certification as exclusive bargaining 
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association implications of Act 10.   The 7th Circuit rejected the argument 
that the prohibition on payroll deductions violated the First Amendment, 
reasoning that the unions’ previous use of the payroll system was the 
equivalent of the state subsidizing the unions’ speech and that Wisconsin 
was free to withdraw this subsidy so long as it did so on a viewpoint neutral 
basis.29  
The second case—Laborers Local 236—rehashed arguments made 
unsuccessfully in Wisconsin state court—i.e. that Act 10 impaired union 
members’ right to freedom of association. The argument, which the 7th 
Circuit rejected, was essentially that Act 10 undermines the ability of labor 
organizations to continue to function and weakens their association to a 
devastating extent, thereby depriving members of the right to freedom of 
association. Judge Flaum wrote for the majority: 
 
[T]he First Amendment does not require the state to 
maintain policies that allow certain associations to 
thrive…Act 10 only acts upon the state.  The law’s changes 
                                                                                                                          
agents, and precluded general-employee unions from using 
automatic payroll deductions and fair-share agreements. The 
plaintiffs, two public-employee unions and an individual union 
member, argue that these changes infringe their First Amendment 
petition and association rights. They also argue that Act 10 denies 
union members the equal protection of the laws. 
Id. at 628. 
29 See Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council, 705 F.3d at 645.  
Act 10's payroll deduction prohibitions do not violate the First 
Amendment. The Unions offer several different First Amendment 
theories to rebut the compelling deference of rational basis review 
required under applicable law. Ultimately, none apply because the 
Supreme Court has settled the question: use of the state's payroll 
systems to collect union dues is a state subsidy of speech that 
requires only viewpoint neutrality. (citations omitted) Admittedly, 
the Unions do offer some evidence of viewpoint discrimination in 
the words of then-Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald 
suggesting Act 10, by limiting unions' fundraising capacity, would 
make it more difficult for President Obama to carry Wisconsin in 
the 2012 presidential election. While Senator Fitzgerald's 
statement may not reflect the highest of intentions, his sentiments 
do not invalidate an otherwise constitutional, viewpoint neutral 
law. Consequently, Act 10's prohibition on payroll dues deduction 
does not violate the First Amendment. 
Id.  
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prevent public employers from acting in certain ways, or 
adopting certain procedures, that were once beneficial to 
Wisconsin public-sector unions and their members.  We 
take the plaintiffs’ point that Act 10 will likely have the 
effect of making things more challenging for general-
employee unions . . . But this type of impairment is not one 
that the Constitution prohibits . . .  An organization cannot 
come up with an associational purpose—even a purpose that 
involves speech—and then require support from the state in 
order to realize its goal.30 
C. FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACT 10 
 
Perhaps the most important consequence of Act 10 has been its 
debilitating effect on the many public sector unions affected by its terms.  
The state’s largest teachers union, The Wisconsin Education Association 
(WEAC) had approximately 100,000 members prior to the passage of Act 
10.31 Since then, membership has dropped by more than 50% to 
                                                                                                                          
30 Labors Local 236 v. Walker, 749 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2014).  
In Smith, the Supreme Court observed that ‘[f]ar from taking steps 
to prohibit or discourage union membership or association, all that 
[the state] has done in its challenged conduct is simply to ignore 
the union. That it is free to do.’ 441 U.S. at 466, 99 S.Ct. 1826.”); 
The same holds true here. The unions cannot wield the First 
Amendment to force Wisconsin to engage in a dialogue or 
continue the state's previous policies. For this reason, none of Act 
10's proscriptions—individually or cumulatively—infringe the 
unions' associational rights.  
Id. at 638-639. 
31 Molly Beck, WEAC Turns to Local Focus After Massive Membership Loss, 
WISC. STATE J., Feb. 22, 2015, http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/education/ 
local_schools/weac-turns-to-local-focus-after-massive-membership-
loss/article_4e31a55e-575b-598f-bb40-6b8ab1e440c5.html.  
Four years after public school teachers lost their guaranteed spot 
at the bargaining table, Wisconsin’s largest teachers union has lost 
more than half its membership and its spending at the Capitol has 
all but disappeared. Now, local members of the Wisconsin 
Education Association Council are turning their efforts toward 
school board races and reaching out to parents in an effort to 
eventually regain some influence in Madison. . . . About 40,000 
public school employees are represented by WEAC, Dustin 
Beilke, Region 6 director told the State Journal editorial board last 
week. WEAC spokeswoman, Christina Brey said it was thousands 
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approximately 40,000 members as of early 2015.  Dues cost approximately 
$750.00 per teacher and it appears that many former members have decided 
not to incur that expense.32 
                                                                                                                          
higher but declined to provide an exact number. Either way, 
membership is down more than 50 percent from the union’s 
98,000-member levels before Gov. Scott Walker signed his 
signature legislation in 2011 that significantly diminished 
collective bargaining rights for most public employees. WEAC’s 
lobbying dollars have dropped dramatically, too. A decade ago, 
WEAC spent $1.5 million on lobbying during the 2005-2006 
legislative session, state records show. The next session: $1.1 
million. During the two sessions leading up to the passage of Act 
10, WEAC spent $2.5 million and $2.3 million, respectively. But 
during the 2013-14 session, after Walker signed the bill into law, 
the union spent just $175,540. It was the first time in at least 10 
years that the union was not among the state’s top 12 lobbying 
spenders, according to the Government Accountability Board. 
Id. 
32 Richard Moore, Members Chipped in $23.4 million to WEAC in 2008 Union 
Dues, LAKELAND TIMES (July 1, 2011), http://www.lakelandtimes.com/ 
main.asp?SectionID=9&subsectionID=110&articleID=13387.  
In addition to the $295.01 in annual dues that full-time teachers 
shell out to the state unit, full-time professional members pay 
$19.99 to the WEAC political action committee for political 
campaigns and lobbying, as well as local union dues and $166 to 
the National Education Association. Contributions to WEAC and 
the NEA thus cost every full-time teacher $461 a year, while total 
dues can swell to more than $750 a year per teacher. For example, 
in the Lakeland area, teachers from Lakeland Union High School, 
MHLT, AV-W, North Lakeland, and Lac du Flambeau chipped in 
union dues totaling $191,746 for the 2010-11 year. According to 
Rich Vought, the superintendent at North Lakeland, teachers pay 
$759 per person there, for a total of $15,180. At AV-W, teachers 
paid $40,194.40. For the 2010-11 school year, the local teachers' 
association at LUHS will pay a total of $50,611.59 to their union, 
says district administrator Todd Kleinhans. He said a full-time 
teacher will pay $783 while dues for part-time teachers are pro-
rated.  MHLT teachers will pay a total of $38,832 in union dues - 
$15,120 goes directly to WEAC - while the lump sum annual 
amount Lac du Flambeau teachers paid in 2010-11 was $46,928. 
Union dues are collected from employee paychecks and a monthly 
check is cut from the district to the local union and sent to the 
Northern Tier UniServe office in Rhinelander on behalf of the 
194 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 23 
 
Financial hardship has translated into reduced political power.  
According to the state of Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, for 
each of the three years leading up to Act 10’s passage, WEAC was either 
first or second in total dollars spent lobbying at the state level.33  From 2009 
to 2011 WEAC spent an average of $1.9 million per year on lobbying.  After 
Act 10, WEAC spent only $175,540 which meant it was not even in the top 
twelve of lobbying spenders.34 
Why did membership drop so dramatically?  Act 10 meant that dues 
could no longer be automatically withdrawn from member paychecks and 
non-members were no longer required to make a “fair share” payment.  If 
you did not want to be a union member, you were now free to go it alone and 
no longer compelled to pay the agency fee.  This is precisely the result the 
Friedrichs plaintiffs hoped for on a national scale.   
A sample of comments from former WEAC members demonstrates 
their post-Act 10 thinking: 
 
 “I don’t see the point of being in a union anymore. Everyone is on 
their own island now.  If you do a good job, everything will take care 
of itself.  The money I’d spend on dues is way more valuable to buy 
groceries for my family.”35 
                                                                                                                          
union, Kleinhans said in an email. Because teachers are paid their 
salaries over a 12-month period, union dues are sent for any 
particular school year beginning in September and continuing 
through August, he added. 
Id. 
33 See generally, Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., 2009-2010 Legislative Session 
Lobbying Summary Reports (2014), http://www.gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publication/68/2009reg_slaesummaryreport_pdf_20437.pdf; Wis. Gov’t 




34 Beck, supra note 30, (“Walker spokeswoman Laurel Patrick said Saturday 
that Act 10 ‘put the power back in the hands of the people and local governments, 
saving Wisconsin taxpayers more than $3 million in the process and allowing public 
employees the freedom to choose if they want to join a union.’”). 
35 Robert Samuels, Walker’s Anti-Union Has Labor Reeling in Wisconsin, THE 
WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-
wisconsin-walkers-anti-union-law-has-crippled-labor-
movement/2015/02/22/1eb3ef82-b6f1-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html 
(statement from 34-year old technology teacher Dan Anliker). 
2016 FRIEDRICHS – ORDERING OF WAGES AND BENEFITS 195 
 
 “[Unions] are just not something I concern myself with…I just look 
to keep improving my teaching in the best way I can and try to keep 
my nose out of the other stuff.”36 
A few unions were reported to have resorted to home visits designed to get 
teachers to sign up for dues collection.37 None of these efforts appear to have 
paid off though.  In August 2001, WEAC issued layoff notices to about 40% 
of its staff.38  This trend has not diminished—the New York Times reports: 
                                                                                                                          
36 Id. (quoting Sean Karsten, a 32-year-old middle and high school reading 
instructor). 
37 Lindsay Fiori, Teachers Unions Visit Homes for Dues Option, THE J. TIMES, 
July 11, 2011, http://journaltimes.com/news/local/teachers-unions-visit-homes-for-
dues-option/article_ff07cf4a-abb0-11e0-bf87-001cc4c03286.html.  
Racine County teachers may have union representatives show up 
on their doorsteps this summer. Area teachers’ unions no longer 
able to automatically deduct dues from teachers’ paychecks 
because of the state’s new budget repair law are using a variety of 
methods including home visits to sign up members to voluntarily 
pay dues. . . .The unions . . . are using a combination of meetings, 
emails, phone calls and home visits to get teachers signed up for 
dues collection, said officials from United Lakewood Educators, 
which includes the Muskego-Norway School District, and 
Southern Lakes United Educators, which includes the Burlington, 
North Cape, Union Grove, Washington-Caldwell, Waterford and 
Drought districts. Officials from the union representing the 10th 
district, Yorkville Federation of Teachers, which serves Yorkville 
Elementary School, could not be reached. 
Id. 
38 Erin Richards, Diminished in the Wake of Act 10, 2 Teachers Unions Explore 
Merger, J. SENTINEL (Jan. 7, 2014), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/education/ 
diminished-in-wake-of-act-10-2-teachers-unions-explore-merger-b99174118z1-
239150441.html.  
Facing reduced membership, revenue and political power in the 
wake of 2011 legislation, Wisconsin's two major state teacher’s 
unions appear poised to merge into a new organization called 
Wisconsin Together. The merger would combine the Wisconsin 
Education Association Council, the state's largest teacher’s union, 
and AFT-Wisconsin, a smaller union that includes technical 
college, higher education and state employees . . .The 
developments underscore the changing landscape for Wisconsin 
teachers unions since the passage of Act 10, which limits 
collective bargaining and makes it more difficult for unions to 
collect dues. After Act 10, WEAC has lost about a third of its 
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“[s]ince [Act 10 passed] … union membership has dropped precipitously.  
Long a labor stronghold, the state has lost tens of thousands of union 
members, leaving Wisconsin with a smaller percentage of union members 
than the national average, new federal figures show. . . . The drop is most 
pronounced in the public sector:  more than half of Wisconsin’s public 
workers were in unions before Mr. Walker’s cuts took effect.  A little more 
than a quarter of them remain.”39  
How and why did this happen in Wisconsin?  It helps to understand 
that in 2011 the state faced a $3.6 billion dollar deficit that looked to extend 
into 2012 and 2013 budget years.  Wisconsin attempted layoffs and 
furloughs40 but the lingering recession and rising compensation levels for 
public employees appears to have created an environment toxic to the claims 
of the public sector unions. While Act 10 protected the status quo for public 
safety employees,41 Walker argued persuasively that it was the inflexibility 
of the state’s public sector unions that created the crisis.  Act 10, he asserted, 
                                                                                                                          
approximately 98,000 members and AFT-Wisconsin is down to 
about 6,500 members from its peak of approximately 16,000, 
leaders of both organizations have reported. . . . Both have 
downsized staff and expenses. 
Id. 
39 Monica Davey, With Fewer Members, a Diminished Political Role for Wisconsin 
Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/ 28/us/with-
fewer-members-a-diminished-political-role-for-wisconsin-unions.html?_r=0. 
40 Melanie Trottman, Public-worker Unions Steel for Budget Fights, WALL 
STREET J. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703989 
50457612850231640306.  
Public-sector unions have begun using their clout against efforts 
to roll back government workers' wages and benefits, cut jobs and 
curtail contract bargaining rights as political leaders from both 
parties look for ways to cut spending. Two of the nation's biggest 
public-sector unions, which together represent about 2.2 million 
government workers, are facing a backlash against the rising costs 
of public workers' pay, benefits and pensions. As states and local 
governments seek to trim costs in a difficult economy, the unions 
are struggling to defend pay and benefit packages negotiated when 
times were flush. 
Id. 
41 Gesina M. Seiler, Court Upholds Part of Controversial Wisconsin Collective 
Bargaining Law, 21 WIS. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2012) (included in the category of 
public safety employees are “police officers, deputy sheriffs, firefighters, state patrol 
officers and state motor vehicle inspectors.”).   
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was a way to avoid cutting budgets and popular eliminating programs in the 
face of public sector union intransigence.42 
For example, the Mequon-Thiensville School District near 
Milwaukee froze teacher salaries for two years thereby saving $560,000.  It 
saved an additional $400,000 by requiring higher contributions to healthcare 
plans.  Administrators argue that circumventing the collective bargaining 
process and the union allowed them to “shift money out of the health plan 
and back into the classroom. [They]’ve increased programming” as a result.43  
It is clear that Walker successfully portrayed the public unions as 
selfish and intransigent in the face of financial crisis.  It is also clear that the 
consequences of Act 10 have been nothing short of catastrophic for those 
unions.44  Shockingly, between 2011 and 2014, membership of the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) fell from 
1000 to 122.45 The loss of members and revenue of course meant a loss in 
political clout as well.  The long-term question for Wisconsin and other states 
that have eliminated agency fees46 is whether, in addition to the short-term 
                                                                                                                          
42 See id.  
There’s no question that Wisconsin may bar its public employees 
from engaging in collective bargaining. The only question for the 
court was whether the state could restrict the rights of general 
employees while granting full rights to public-safety employees. 
The law allows such “line drawing” as long as the government can 
articulate a rational basis for doing so and a suspect class isn’t 
involved. State officials argued that the law doesn’t limit the 
bargaining rights of members who perform the most essential 
functions of maintaining public safety because of concerns over 
strikes. 
Id. 
43 Greenhouse, supra note 10 (quoting Ted Neitzke, school superintendent in 
West Bend, Wisconsin). See id. (statement of James R. Scott, chairman of the 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission) (“[A]s a result of Act 10, the 
advantages that labor held have been diminished. . . . It’s fair to say that employers 
have the upper hand now.”).  
44 See generally, Charles J. Russo, Collective Bargaining in Public Education: 
It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times, 291 ED. L. REP. 545 (2013); 
Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011, 27 ABA J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 293 (2012); Samuels, supra note 35. See also Appendix A. 
45 Greenhouse, supra note 10, at 8 (statement from Wisconsin attorney, Lester 
A. Pines) (“The law . . . is destroying unions with a thousand cuts and making it 
seem that it’s their fault.”). 
46 See Mike Antonucci, Teachers Unions at Risk of Losing “Agency Fees”, 16 
EDU. NEXT 22, fig. 1 at 27 (2016), http://educationnext.org/teachers-unions-risk-
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savings the state and its municipalities were able to obtain, a longer term 
restructuring of wages and benefits will be possible.  Benefits are likely to 
be the primary focus both in Wisconsin and beyond as the compensation gap 
between private and public employees seems to support a conclusion that it 
is benefits and not wages that are exceptional in the public sector. 
 
III. ARE PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES OVERPAID? 
 
Were cities and towns that responded to Act 10 by freezing salaries, 
cutting benefits and generally holding the line on public employee labor 
costs after 2011 in fact “right sizing” or were they simply taking advantage 
of a newly politically vulnerable group of employees?  It turns out that 
figuring out whether or not public employees are overcompensated is trickier 
than it seems.  There is a substantial literature that purports to demonstrate 
that public school teachers and other public sector workers are overpaid.47 
Public Sector unions, for their part, have made some attempts to refute this 
                                                                                                                          
losing-agency-fees-friedrichs-california/ (providing map of which states allow for 
agency fees to be collected and which do not).   
47 See, e.g., Andrew G. Biggs & Jason Richwine, Assessing the Compensation 
of public-school teachers, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (2011) (“[w]e conclude that 
public-school teacher salaries are comparable to those paid to similarly skilled 
private sector workers, but that more generous fringe benefits for public-school 
teachers, including greater job security, make total compensation 52 percent greater 
than fair market levels, equivalent to more than $120 billion overcharged to 
taxpayers each year.”); Steven Greenhut, California Faces Death by Pension, THE 
AMERICAN SPECTATOR (Oct. 29, 2014 8:00 AM), http://spectator.org/ 
60778_california-faces-death-pension/ (Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s chief 
pension adviser, David Crane, giving testimony in 2010 before the California 
Senate) (“All of the consequences of rising pension costs fall on the budgets for 
programs such as higher education, health and human services, parks and recreation 
and environmental protection that are junior in priority and therefore have their 
funding reduced whenever more money is needed to pay for pension costs[.]”); 
Robert C. Pozen, The Other Debt Bomb in Public Employee Benefits, THE WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 15, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/robert-c-pozen-the-other-debt-bomb-
in-public-employee-benefits-1421367030 (noting that New York City has unfunded 
retiree health care liabilities of $22,857 per household and recommending that 
jurisdictions increase disclosure of costs as a mechanism which would encourage 
voters to consider reform); Mark Casciari & Barbara Borowski, Rightsizing Public 
Employee Retirement Benefits: How Have State Courts Resolved the Constitutional 
Issues?, 26 BENEFITS. L. J.  22 (2013) (suggesting that states will continue to try and 
cutback state and local employee benefits as long as they are facing funding 
shortfalls). 
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view.48 Scholarly work that is not overly politicized seems to provide some 
support for the Walker view: 
 
After controlling for skill differences and incorporating 
employer costs for benefits packages, we find that, on 
average, public sector workers in state government have 
compensation costs 3-10 percent greater than those for 
workers in the private sector, while in local government the 
gap is 10-19 percent.  We caution that this finding is 
somewhat dependent on the chosen sample and 
specification, that averages can obscure broader differences 
in distributions, and that a host of worker and job attributes 
are not available to us in these data.  Nonetheless that data 
suggest that public sector workers, especially local 
government ones, on average, receive greater remuneration 
than observably similar private sector workers.49 
A. A MORAL HAZARD STORY 
 
As I’ve argued elsewhere,50 there is certainly a growing body of 
evidence which supports the Walker narrative:  that when public finances are 
                                                                                                                          
48 See Nicholas Kristof, Pay Teachers More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at 
WK10 (“A basic educational challenge is not that teachers are raking it in, but that 
they are underpaid. If we want to compete with other countries, and chip away at 
poverty across America, then we need to pay teachers more so as to attract better 
people into the profession. . . . These days, brilliant women become surgeons and 
investment bankers — and 47 percent of America’s kindergarten through 12th-grade 
teachers come from the bottom one-third of their college classes [as measured by 
SAT scores]”). 
49 Maury Gittleman & Brooks Pierce, Compensation for State and Local 
Government Workers, 26 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 217 (2011) (observing two sets of 
data) (“[I]n both data sets, the raw wage gap shows public sector workers being paid 
more. In [one], the raw gap in hourly earnings is about 4 percent; in the [other], 
hourly wages in government sectors exceed those in the private sector by an average 
of about 30 percent.”). 
50 See e.g., Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing 
Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525 (2013). 
If the core problem is . . . a strong tendency to overpromise 
because of strong forces that encourage morally hazardous 
behavior, who should bear the cost when a municipality cannot 
keep the promises it made? Does it matter that municipal creditors 
are typically either very sophisticated—i.e., bondholders and their 
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insurers—or possibly less savvy but often intimately involved in 
a long pattern of reckless spending that has directly contributed to 
the financial crisis—i.e., public employees and the unions that 
represent them? . . . Culpability for the mess in Central Falls 
certainly resides with the political actors who, aided and abetted 
by public employees, promised benefits far beyond what the poor 
town could afford. . . . Politicians are well known for their cavalier 
attitude toward “other people’s money. . . .The guilty role played 
by public employees and their representatives is by now so well 
understood that it requires little further explanation. Suffice it to 
say that the public employee/legislator relationship was beneficial 
to all concerned save the current and future taxpayer. Can the 
elected official/lender/public employee axis be broken? The only 
way forward appears to be some combination of structural 
changes and increased transparency. A variety of proposals have 
been advanced in recent years; terminating defined benefit plans 
and moving employees to defined contribution arrangements 
similar to the private sector’s 401 (k) vehicle is among the most 
promising. Modest reforms include requiring public plans to use 
realistic, market-based rates of return when making assumptions 
about asset growth that directly impact the size of future liabilities. 
More radical, but perhaps not unreasonable in extreme situations 
. . . is the call to simply bar legislators from negotiating with public 
unions about pensions and/or retiree health benefits. 
Id. at 529, 543, 555-557.  
See also Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Case for Public Pension Reform: Early From 
Kentucky, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 585 (2014). 
The first sign that over promising has occurred with pension 
promises is often the failure of the state, as with Kentucky, to 
make its required contribution. Why is payment not made as 
promised? Well, legislators remember that they have a variety of 
other commitments besides pensions - public education, roads, 
prisons, public health - to name a few. These generally require 
immediate spending in order to satisfy the public's demand for 
services. Pensions, on the other hand, are a future expense which 
can be delayed. Over time, of course, repeated delay creates a 
larger and larger shortfall which must one day be made up. But, 
that long term horizon is not the horizon for the typical politician 
who hopes/expects to have moved on to bigger and better things 
by the time the shortfall has mushroomed into a full blown crisis. 
Id. at 596-597.  
See also Maria O’Brien Hylton, After Tackett: Incomplete Contracts for Post-
Employment Healthcare, 36 PACE L. REV. 317, 368-369 (2016) (“Numerous state 
and local government employers have been forced to reckon with the size and scope 
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tight and tax increases are politically infeasible, the natural cost cutting 
response one might expect to see is often thwarted by labor agreements 
which bind local governments to a cost structure that is unsustainable.  It is 
not generally wages but instead the promises made with respect to employee 
benefits—pension costs and active and retiree health care commitments—
that overwhelm states51 and municipalities alike.  The reason for this, like all 
stories about morally hazardous52 behavior, is rooted in the cavalier way in 
                                                                                                                          
of benefits that had been promised to public employees - often without much thought 
to the future cost to taxpayers. Indeed, some states are still trying, very publicly, to 
come to terms with the cost of post-employment benefits that threaten to crowd out 
all other spending.”). 
51 See e.g., David W. Chen & Mary Williams Walsh, New York City Pension 
System Is Strained by Costs and Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/nyregion/new-york-city-pension-system-is-
strained-by-costs-and-politics.html. 
For years, New York City has been dutifully pumping more and 
more money into its giant pension system for retired city workers. 
. . . But instead of getting smaller, the city’s pension hole just 
keeps getting bigger, forcing progressively more significant 
cutbacks in municipal programs and services every year. Like 
pension systems everywhere, New York City’s has been strained 
by a growing retiree population that is living longer, global market 
conditions and other factors. But a close examination of the 
system’s problems reveals a more glaring issue: Its investment 
strategy has failed to keep up with its growing costs, hampered by 
an antiquated and inefficient governing structure that often 
permits politics to intrude on decisions. The $160 billion system 
is spread across five separate funds, each with its own board of 
trustees, all making decisions with further input from consultants 
and even lawmakers in Albany. . .. Like many public systems, 
New York has promised irrevocable pension benefits to city 
workers on the thinking that fund investments would grow enough 
to cover the cost — but they have not. Its response so far has been 
to take advantage of a recovering local economy and inject a lot 
more city money into the pension system quickly — an option not 
available to declining cities like Detroit, which filed for 
bankruptcy last year, or a tax-averse state like New Jersey, which 
has been underfunding its pension system for years. 
Id. 
52 See Definition of ‘Moral Hazard’, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016), 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/moral-hazard (the Economic Times 
defining moral hazard as “[A] situation in which one party gets involved in a risky 
event knowing that it is protected against the risk and the other party will incur the 
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which human beings behave when they are tasked with spending other 
people’s money. 
The key insight offered by the study of moral hazard is that people 
treat valuable resources differently—the degree of care exercised depends 
on the ownership of those resources.  When dollars that belong to someone 
else are being spent the level of care is much lower than what is observed 
when owned dollars are expended.  This phenomenon is easy to observe in 
almost any insurance context.  Homeowners and automobile insurers, for 
example, routinely require deductibles in order to minimize the likelihood 
that an insured will simply exercise an unacceptable level of care given the 
presence of the insurance.  The homeowner, for example, who carelessly 
neglects to put out a cigarette or extinguish a fire in the fireplace or the 
automobile owner who parks in a dangerous neighborhood and fails to lock 
her vehicle are much more likely to be careful with their property in the 
absence of any insurance.  Insurance, well aware of this problem, insist on 
“sharing the loss” by requiring deductibles; health insurers, wary of 
unnecessary visits to the doctor do the same thing by way of co-pays and 
other forms of cost sharing. 
 How is this connected to public sector employee benefits?  The story 
of how so many cities and states have ended up overpaying for employee 
benefits is fundamentally a story about simple moral hazard too. Elected 
officials, entrusted by voters to negotiate wages and benefits with public 
sector employees are especially vulnerable to the moral hazard encountered 
when considering how to spend taxpayer dollars.  Aware that the taxpayer is 
almost certainly not paying attention to the details53 and eager to keep well 
organized groups of public employees who both vote and provide support 
during election campaigns happy, elected officials have, time and again, 
                                                                                                                          
cost. It arises when both the parties have incomplete information about each other.”). 
An example of moral hazard would be a homeowner with full homeowner’s 
insurance choosing not to install a security system because he or she know the 
insurance company will bear the burden, should a burglary occur. See id.  
53 Hence the calls by Pozen and others for greater transparency. Since 2003, the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”) has been studying 
government action and suggested that states should be more transparent in their 
functions, particularly in financial statements. GASB even suggests that derivatives 
be included in financial statement in order make more transparent what the 
government is leveraging to accomplish deals and transactions. See Derivatives: 
GASB Proposes More Transparency, USER’S PERSP. (Gov’t Accounting Standards 
Bd. Norwalk, C.T.) May 2006, http://gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=GASBContent_ 
C&pagename=GASB%2FGASBContent_C%2FUsersArticlePage&cid=11761567
37013.  
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opted to over promise in the present and let future generations worry about 
how to pay later. This is unequivocally the subtext from Illinois54 to 
California55 and Rhode Island.56 
                                                                                                                          
54 See Hal Dardick, Illinois Supreme Court ruling forces city to find new fix for 
2 pension funds, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2016, 6:28 PM), http://www.chicago 
tribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-chicago-pension-law-ruling-0325-20160323-
story.html.  
The Illinois Supreme Court dealt Mayor Rahm Emanuel — and in 
turn Chicago taxpayers — a big blow on Thursday when it found 
unconstitutional a law that aimed to shore up two city pension 
funds by cutting benefits and requiring workers to pay more 
toward retirement. A group of unions, current workers and retired 
employees sued in response to the law, noting the 1970 Illinois 
Constitution states that pension benefits, once granted, ‘shall not 
be diminished or impaired.’ In a 5-0 ruling, the state's high court 
once again agreed with that argument, less than a year after 
reaching the same conclusion in a separate case covering state 
pension systems. . . . The new ruling raises further questions about 
the city's precarious financial situation. . . . [T]he loss also 
exacerbates the city's massive financial problems over the long 
term — the funding shortfall in the two retirement funds would 
continue to grow by about $900 million a year, and taxpayers 
could end up plugging the gap. 
Id. 
55 See Melody Petersen, California public workers may be at risk of losing 
promised pensions, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/la-fi-pension-controversy-20150317-story.html.  
As millions of private employees lost their pension benefits in 
recent years, government workers rested easy, believing that their 
promised retirements couldn't be touched. Now the safety of a 
government pension in California may be fading fast. Feeling the 
heat is the state's huge public pension fund, the California Public 
Employees' Retirement System, known as CalPERS. The fund 
spent millions of dollars to defend itself and public employee 
pensions in the bankruptcy cases of two California cities — only 
to lose the legal protections that it had spent years building 
through legislation. The agency's most significant setback came in 
Stockton's bankruptcy case. The judge approved the city's 
recovery plan, including maintaining employees' pensions, but 
ruled that Stockton could have legally chosen to cut workers' 
retirements . . . . Part of the problem is that many cities have 
promised workers pensions that are more generous than those still 
offered in the private sector. Many government workers retire at 
50 or 55 on lifelong payments that can nearly match their salaries 
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In Wisconsin it really did not matter whether the unions were as 
intransigent as Walker portrayed them; what was critical is that the public 
came to believe that when a financial crisis struck, public sector employees 
were unwilling to face the same reduced circumstances as private sector 
taxpayers.  Job loss, pay cuts, increased health care expenses57—painfully 
                                                                                                                          
if they were longtime employees. Increasing payments to 
CalPERS was one reason that Stockton and San Bernardino were 
forced to file for bankruptcy. . . . CalPERS' efforts to protect itself 
and workers' retirements began decades ago when it pushed 
through two state laws with help from the politically powerful 
unions. The first law said that a city's contract with CalPERS 
could not be canceled in bankruptcy. The second allowed 
CalPERS to place a costly lien on a city's property — in essence, 
a new and far more expensive bill for pensions — if the city left 
CalPERS and provided retirement benefits through a different 
fund. The cost of the threatened lien was so steep — in Stockton, 
CalPERS demanded $1.6 billion — that no city in bankruptcy has 
left the fund. 
Id. 
56 See Mary Williams Walsh & Abby Goodnough, A Small City’s Depleted 
Pension Fund Rattles Rhode Island, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/business/central-falls-ri-faces-bankruptcy-
over-pension-promises.html.  
The small city of Central Falls, R.I., appears to be headed for a 
rare municipal bankruptcy filing, and state officials are rushing to 
keep its woes from overwhelming the struggling state. The 
impoverished city, operating under a receiver for a year, has 
promised $80 million worth of retirement benefits to 214 police 
officers and firefighters, far more than it can afford. Those 
workers’ pension fund will probably run out of money in October, 
giving Central Falls the distinction of becoming the second 
municipality in the United States to exhaust its pension fund, after 
Prichard, Ala. . . . Some of the retirees are in their 90s, and Central 
Falls, like many American cities, has not placed its police and 
firefighters in Social Security. Many have no other benefits to fall 
back on. 
Id. 
57 The Cadillac Tax in the Affordable Care Act will begin enforcing a 40% tax 
of any health plan for the amount of the plan that exceeds $10,200 (for an individual 
plan) and $27,500 (for a family plan) in 2018. This was meant to ensure employees 
kept the cost of health insurance in mind and did not require employers to dole out 
too much for high insurance, but it resulted in union resentment, as unions have 
begun to have the tax leveraged against them in collective bargaining agreements. 
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experienced by those without the benefit of a union—did not result in union 
envy but in union resentment.  Private sector workers did not wish they could 
join a public sector union; instead they wished that those who were already 
members would accept less so that taxes would not have to be increased or 
services decreased in order to survive the crisis. 
      The Great Recession which began in 2008 laid bare the huge 
differences in job protections, health care costs and retirement benefits 
enjoyed by public and private sector employees.58  Private sector employers 
shed workers rapidly as needed. Meanwhile, the public sector unions seemed 
impervious to the resentment their generous benefits and job security 
engendered.59 People who collected unemployment benefits60 and struggled 
                                                                                                                          
See Kate Taylor, Health Care Law Raises Pressure On Public Unions, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 5, 2013), at A1. 
58 See Michael Cooper, Government Jobs Have Grown Since Recession, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/us/20states.html.  
While the private sector has shed 6.9 million jobs since the 
beginning of the recession, state and local governments have 
expanded their payrolls and added 110,000 jobs . . . The 
expansion, coming as many states and localities are raising taxes, 
troubled Tad DeHaven, a budget analyst for the Cato Institute, a 
libertarian research group in Washington. ‘That is disturbing,’ Mr. 
DeHaven said. ‘Basically what you have is your producers in 
society losing their jobs and looking for work, and their tax burden 
isn’t necessarily going down — and as a matter of fact they are 
likely to face tax increases going forward — and government 
growing.’ . . . . The disparity between the public and private sector 
job market is striking in places like Boise, Idaho. Since the 
recession began, the area’s unemployment rate has more than 
doubled, to over 10.1 percent in June, as big employers, especially 
in the technology sector, shed workers. The Boise area lost 20,000 
jobs in the year ending in June, the Idaho Labor Department said, 
and saw real gains only in government, which had an increase of 
1,400 jobs, mostly in the public schools. 
Id. 
59 Dave Umhoefer, Gov. Scott Walker says he asked unions for concessions and 
they refused, POLTIFACT (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/ 
statements/2011/sep/16/scott-walker/gov-scott-walker-says-he-asked-unions-
concessions-/ (quoting a campaign fundraising letter written by Scott Walker, dated 
Sept. 2, 2011) (“I asked the unions to pay into their own health care insurance and 
they said I was being unreasonable . . . I requested that they contribute toward their 
own pensions and they screamed it was unfair.").  
60 Each state’s unemployment system works slightly differently, but to qualify 
there are some general requirements most states include. The unemployed worker 
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to hold onto their homes61 could simply not be counted on to listen 
sympathetically to proposals to raise taxes in order to honor promises made 
to teachers and others whose still—employed status inspired raw envy. 
      It appears that in Wisconsin and elsewhere public sector unions 
either couldn’t or wouldn’t confront the relatively luxurious status of their 
members.  Walker saw an open door and walked through it.  The plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                          
must be unemployed (not part-time or self-employed), must make a claim and 
cooperate with their local unemployment office, and must be ready, willing, and able 
to work. If an unemployed worker meets all the eligibility requirements and follows 
the guidance of their local unemployment office, they can generally collect pay 
through federal and state unemployment taxes. See The Unemployment Benefits 
System: How it Works and When to Contest a Claim, BIZFILINGS (May 2, 2016), 
http://www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/sbg/office-hr/managing-the-
workplace/unemployment-benefits-system-info.aspx.  
61 Ingrid Gould Ellen & Samuel Dastrup, Housing and the Great Recession, 
RECESSION TRENDS, STAN. CTR. POVERTY AND INEQ. (Oct. 2012).  
Since the first quarter of 2006, U.S. households have lost over $7 
trillion in home equity. As a result, CoreLogic estimates that 22 
percent of homeowners with mortgages are now “underwater,” or 
have an outstanding mortgage balance that exceeds the value of 
their home. . . . Equity losses also appear to have been particularly 
severe for minority households. A recent study by the Pew 
Research Center found that median wealth fell by 66 percent from 
2005 to 2009 among Hispanic households and 53 percent among 
Black households, as compared with just 16 percent among White 
households . . . Reductions in homeownership rates following the 
housing crash have also been more extreme for minority groups. 
While all racial and ethnic groups have experienced a decline in 
homeownership in recent years, the fall has been sharpest for 
Blacks and Latinos . . . just 44.2 percent of Black households and 
47.1 percent of Latino households owned their homes in 2010, 
down from 46.3 and 49.3 percent respectively in 2006 . . . 
homeownership rates have also fallen much more sharply for 
young adults as compared to older adults. This is both because 
transitions out of homeownership are less likely for older 
homeowners and because transitions into homeownership have 
slowed due to the weak labor market, uncertainty about prices, and 
tightened underwriting. . . . Data from the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development show that the estimated number 
of homeless families in the United States rose by 30 percent to 
170,000 from 2007 to 2009, with the average length of stays in 
shelters rising during the recession as well. 
Id. at 2-5. 
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in Friedrichs sensed the same vulnerability and, but for the unexpected 
change in the composition of the Supreme Court, almost obtained the same 
result.  There is no doubt but that Wisconsin’s experience would have been 
duplicated around the country in states that permit the collection of agency 
fees.  It is certain that membership in public sector unions would have 
declined rapidly along with revenue and lobbying efforts.  States would 
suddenly discover that public sector employee benefits were slightly more 
vulnerable at least to future reductions.62  
                                                                                                                          
62 See, e.g., Amy Monahan, Understanding the Legal Limits on Public Pension 
Reform, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. at 5 (2013) (“Arizona’s constitution specifically 
protects public employee pensions by providing that ‘membership in a public 
retirement system is a contractual relationship that is subject to Article II, §25, and 
public retirement system benefits shall not be diminished or impaired’”); Amy B. 
Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform, The Legal Framework, U. of Minn. L. 
School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 10-13. 
A handful of states have rejected a contract-based approach to 
public pensions in favor of a property-based approach. To the 
extent that rights in a public pension plan are considered property, 
they are protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution from deprivation without due process of law. 
In addition, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
prohibits the taking of property without just compensation. 
Id. at 24. 
See also David J. Kahne, Protecting Pensions And Contract Rights For Public 
Sector Employees, STROOCK REPS. (STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP) August 
4, 2015. 
Public sector employees in certain states can use the non-
impairment clause to protect their pension rights from unilateral 
reductions imposed by a state or local government. Under many 
state constitutions, including New York's, pensions are granted 
contractual status. Article V § 7 of the New York State 
Constitution declares that, "membership in any pension or 
retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be 
a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be 
diminished or impaired." Notably, there is no qualification. Thus, 
any judicial or legislative action that seeks to impair pension rights 
is arguably a violation of New York's Non-Impairment Clause. 
Case law and the legislative history confirms that the purpose of 
New York's Non-Impairment Clause was "to fix the rights of the 
employees at the time of commencement of membership in the 
[pension] system, rather than as previously at retirement." The 
clause prohibits unilateral action by either the Legislature or the 
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B. FRIEDRICHS AGAIN? 
 
It seems likely that the organizations63 which coordinated and funded the 
Friedrichs litigation will try again.  Public school teachers will probably 
                                                                                                                          
employer that would diminish or impair the rights employees have 
gained through their membership in the system. 
Id.  
Further, states like Illinois have declared benefits such as healthcare for retired state 
workers to be a “constitutionally protected pension benefit.” See Karl Plume, Illinois 
high court rules constitution protects health benefits, REUTERS (July 3, 2014) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-illinois-retiree-healthcare-
idUSL2N0PE10720140703 (“'It's too soon to say what the implications of this ruling 
are,’ said . . . senior credit officer Ted Hampton. But he added that it ‘casts doubt’ 
on the pension reform law.”). 
63 One such example is the Center for Individual Rights (“CIR”). See Mission, 
CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2016), https://www.cir-usa.org/mission/ (“The 
Center for Individual Rights (CIR) is a non-profit public interest law firm dedicated 
to the defense of individual liberties against the increasingly aggressive and 
unchecked authority of federal and state governments.”); Freidrichs v CTA: Case 
Timeline, supra note 1. On September 10th and 11th, 2015, there were 25 different 
Amicus Briefs filed in support of the Plaintiff. See Docket 14-915, Freidrichs v. Cal. 
Teachers Ass’n. 136 S.Ct. 2545 (2016). One Amicus Brief, filed by the Cato 
Institute, delivered a stinging and unrelenting attack on labor unions’ “opt-out” 
practices currently in place, requiring people who rejected joining the union, but are 
forced to pay agency fees, to affirmatively out-out of particular ideological or 
political speech. Brief for the Cato Institute As Amicus Curiae In Support of 
Petitioners, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S.Ct. 2545 (2016). 
For the reasons stated in Harris v. Quinn, (citation omitted), the 
First Amendment does not permit government to compel public 
employees to associate with a labor union and subsidize its speech 
on matters of public concern. The Court should therefore overrule 
its aberrant decision to the contrary in Abood . . . the opt-out 
scheme administered by Respondents is designed to ensnare 
dissenting teachers who inadvertently fail to register an objection 
during the prescribed opt-out period, as well as those who 
subsequently come to oppose the union’s political speech. A 
teacher, for example, might assume that the California Teachers 
Association’s political and ideological speech is confined to issues 
relating to education and public schools and may well be surprised 
to learn partway through the school year that it engages in 
advocacy on abortion, immigration re- form, and other 
controversial issues. Yet that teacher is required to subsidize the 
union’s speech on those matters—with funds deducted from her 
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remain a fertile group from which to recruit plaintiffs given the ongoing 
fights around the country over charter schools and the efficacy of public 
schools.64 The speed with which the Court is asked to review Abood will 
certainly depend on the perceived receptivity of Scalia’s replacement to the 
First Amendment claims made by the Friedrichs plaintiffs.65 Taxpayers, 
                                                                                                                          
paycheck week after week—until the next opportunity to opt out. 
This is a plain-as-day violation of the “bedrock principle” that “no 
person in this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a 
third party that he or she does not wish to support.” Harris, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2644. A decision flipping the presumption—from opt out to 
opt in—would correct this wholesale infringement of First 
Amendment rights and put labor unions on an equal footing with 
all other groups that rely on truly voluntary contributions. 
 Id. at 1-3. 
64 One principal, Kelian Betlach, at Elmhurst Community Prep in Oakland, 
California faces the same problem every year:  
[A] common one at schools like Elmhurst, where 91 percent of 
students qualify for free- or reduced-price lunch, a federal measure 
of poverty, and 33 percent are classified as English language 
learners. Many of the factors keeping teachers from showing up at 
schools like his are beyond the control of any single principal. 
Across the country, an improving economy has pulled teachers 
and potential teachers away from the profession, creating a 
growing national shortage. In California . . . competition for 
qualified teachers is particularly stiff. . . . Chronic underfunding 
of schools in California means that teaching jobs are not as secure 
as they once were and, in many parts of the state, a teacher’s salary 
won’t sustain a middle-class lifestyle. At the same time, a growing 
number of urban charter schools, focused on the same population 
as schools like Elmhurst, offer bigger paychecks for young, 
ambitious teachers willing to tie their salaries to their 
performance—a particularly fraught issue in California. . . . 
Finding and keeping teachers who can excel at working in urban 
schools may seem a Sisyphean task. And yet it is one at which 
principals like Betlach must succeed, every year, or risk their 
students’ fragile educational progress.  
Lillian Mongeau, Teachers Wanted: Passion a Must, Patience Required, Pay 
Negligible: Turnover is highest in the neediest schools, and competition for new 
educators is getting stiffer, ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
education/archive/2015/09/teachers-wanted-passion-a-must-patience-required-pay-
negligible/404371/. 
65 The Senate is trying its hardest to ensure that Scalia’s replacement is at least 
somewhat ideologically close to the late Justice. The Senate has evaded voting, or 
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legislators and public sector unions everywhere should both anticipate the 
renewal of this dispute and focus on the core policy questions it raises. Are 
public sector benefits too generous?  Are public employees overpaid in some 
fundamental sense?  If indeed public sector collective bargaining is just a 
species of lobbying which has resulted in the “capture” of various 
legislatures around the country,66 then legislators and public sector unions 
might do well to reconsider the cozy relationships they have cultivated.  
Maybe it is time for legislators not just to be seen negotiating but to actually 
negotiate with an eye toward financial commitments that are affordable and 
sustainable. 
       Act 10 was not so much an endorsement of Scott Walker as a furious 
rejoinder to the failure of Wisconsin political actors to adequately represent 
the interests of the people who elected them.  Hostility to agency fees is based 
on a sense that public unions have a disproportionately large voice in public 
affairs; that they have created and coddled an entrenched and inefficient 
workforce,67 and harmed school aged children, especially those from poor 
                                                                                                                          
even holding hearings, on President Obama’s middle-of-the-road nomination, 
Merrick Garland, for over 100 days at the time of this article’s writing. Though there 
has been similar backlash and stalling late in other presidents’ final terms, the 
Garland blockade is unprecedented in length and a shining display of the ideological 
split the country is facing, as well as the importance of late Justice Scalia’s seat. See 
Ed. Bd., The Senate’s Confirmation Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2016, at A22. 
66 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010). 
To achieve either expert or nonpartisan decision making, one must 
avoid undue industry influence, or ‘capture.’ Unfortunately, as 
Richard Stewart has observed, “[i]t has become widely accepted, 
not only by public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, 
legislators, judges, and even by some agency members, that the 
comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in 
the process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in 
favor of these interests.” . . . one can never hope to avoid all hints 
of capture. But as with expertise, the question is whether one can 
achieve some insulation from interest group pressure. 
Id. at 21-24. 
67 One example of this is the use of “rubber rooms” where teachers awaiting 
disciplinary hearings draw full salary and benefits not to work, but to sit and wait. 
See Jennifer Medina, Deal Reached to Fix Teacher Discipline Process, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 16, 2010), at A1 (discussing the supposed removal of “rubber rooms” in NYC 
and how unions continue impede the disciplinary process by making teachers very 
difficult to fire). See generally WAITING FOR SUPERMAN (Walden Media 2010) 
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and moderate income families who do not enjoy the luxurious option of 
private school education.68  One cannot help but ask, if public unions are not 
coercing speech, then how to understand the dramatic drop in membership?  
Why aren’t employees supporting an organization that is accurately 
reflecting its members’ positions on a wide range of issues? 
      Taxpayers are asking what they have to lose if public sector union 
power is dramatically reduced.  Wisconsin has answered that question.  In 
the short run, as salaries are contained or reduced, budget pressure is relieved 
and dollars can go to services which might otherwise be cut in times of crisis.  
Public sector unions become less politically important and less able to 
articulate their views as their staffs shrink.  Over the longer term we should 
expect to see relief for taxpayers as well from onerous benefits 
commitments—especially those for retiree health care, active employee 
health care and pensions.  As others have suggested, we may see more and 
more public employees getting their insurance from a state of federal health 
care exchange.69 In the same way the private sector shed many of the 
obligations70 we would expect that state and local governments would 
                                                                                                                          
(criticizing the American public school system for how it handles disciplining, 
reprimanding, and firing tenured teachers).  
68 Some advocate for charter schools as a “replacement system for the failed 
urban [school] system.” A solution like this would involve “closing low-performing 
traditional and charter schools” to only allow schools that are successful educators, 
as deemed by the local government or educational authority, to continue operating. 
In addition, these advocates suggest allowing failing public school to be taken over 
by a charter company if it means the students’ quality of education will increase. 
Under their view, urban students are the most needy students, yet their needs are not 
close to being met and “well-meaning education reformers” are simply not meeting 
these students’ needs properly.  See Emma Brown, Can traditional school systems 




69 See Natalya Shnitser, Accounting and the ACA: New Choices and Challenges 
for Public Sector Retiree Health Plans, 20 EM. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 147 (2016). 
70 See Susan E. Cancelosi, VEBAS to the Rescue: Evaluating One Alternative 
for Public Sector Retiree Health Benefits, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 879, 880-81 
(2009). 
When private sector employers realized the impact of FAS 106 on 
their balance sheets, many chose to terminate retiree health 
benefits. Others imposed a variety of cost-containment measures. 
Collectively bargained employers, however, generally could not 
take such steps. Constrained by their agreements with unions, they 
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follow.  The private ordering that has dominated everywhere but in the 
unionized public sector should creep into the public sector as union power 
there declines. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Many supporters of pension and health care benefits reform for the 
public sector were disappointed by the stalemate produced by Freidrichs 
following the death of Justice Scalia. The Court seemed poised to overturn 
Abood and usher in a new era of in which fees for contract administration, 
grievance adjustment, etc. were forbidden as impermissible interference with 
employee free speech rights. Abood has long been justified on anti-free 
riding grounds, although no one seriously argued that concerns about free 
riding were sufficient to overcome interference with the constitutional rights 
of public employees. The recent experience in Wisconsin provides a window 
into what a post-Abood world will almost certainly look like. It is an 
environment in which public union power is significantly constrained, 
                                                                                                                          
had little flexibility in managing their retiree health expenses. 
Large, traditional manufacturing companies - with high 
concentrations of unionized retirees and historically generous 
benefit packages, but shrinking active workforces and negative 
economic forecasts - found themselves struggling to remain 
financially viable in the face of overwhelming liabilities. The 
public sector today faces similar problems. Because GASB 45 
demands that government employers acknowledge the true level 
of retiree health offers, they risk balance sheet disasters. Most 
have financed retiree health benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis, 
with no assets set aside for future expenses. Many are heavily 
unionized, with little room to shift costs to retirees, much less to 
terminate benefits. Some have constitutional or statutory 
guarantees that protect benefit commitments. Although they do 
not risk liquidation the way private sector employers do, financial 
insolvency affects state and local governments' ability to raise 
money to finance public services and projects. Government 
employers, moreover, depend on the good will of taxpayers. They 
cannot easily raise taxes or divert funds from other sources. 
Meanwhile, the current depressed economy translates to severe 
budget problems for state and local governments across the 
country. The similarities between the public sector today and the 
private sector of the early 1990s raise intriguing questions about 
possible solutions for the public sector. 
Id. at 880-881. 
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membership levels drop and public union political activity decreases. These 
changes appear to have made unilateral reductions in the cost of public sector 
employee benefits politically feasible resulting in savings to taxpayers. The 
Freidrichs decision leaves the problem of forced speech by public employees 
unresolved. As states continue to grapple with rapidly escalating benefits 
costs in the public sector, one would expect to see another Freidrichs-type 
challenge emerge in the not too distant future. 
 
  
















                                        
